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Plaintiff manufacturer sued defendants, a graphic designer, and her lawyer, for malicious prosecution based on a cross-complaint in a prior dispute about the ownership of the artwork. The trial court denied the defendants' motion to strike under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16, the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute. The Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reversed. Plaintiff appealed. The lawyer business

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The Court of Appeal held that the malicious prosecution action was subject to anti-SLAPP scrutiny. On further review, the court agreed and declined to create a categorical exemption for malicious prosecution causes of action. Plaintiff argued there was no evidence the legislature intended § 425.16 to apply to malicious prosecution claims, but the court reasoned that the statute was not ambiguous with respect to whether its protection of “ any act” furthering protected rights encompassed suing for malicious prosecution. Nothing in the statute excluded any particular type of action from its operation. Plaintiff's attempted analogy between the litigation privilege and the anti-SLAPP statute was inapt, because the anti-SLAPP statute if applied, would not have the effect of barring claims that were legally sufficient and supported by a prima facie showing. The Court of Appeal was also correct that the plaintiff had not met its burden on the merits prong. The entry of summary judgment on the underlying cross-claim on grounds of insufficient evidence did not establish as a matter of law that the plaintiff necessarily could “ state and substantiate” a subsequent malicious prosecution claim.

The court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal.

Plaintiff city sought review of the judgment of the Court of Appeal (California), which invalidated two provisions of a preliminary injunction entered by the trial court against defendant, criminal street gang, under the provisions of Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 737, Cal. Civ. Code § 3480.

Preliminary injunction was entered against the defendant, criminal street gang, under the provisions of Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 737, Cal. Civ. Code § 3480. The appellate court upheld only provisions enjoining acts or conduct defined as crimes under the penal code. The court reversed the judgment of the appellate court, which invalidated two provisions of a preliminary injunction. The court held that the defendants' association was not entitled to protection under U.S. Const. amend. I, because the gang was not formed for the purpose of engaging in protected speech or religious activities. The court held that the trial court's preliminary decree was not overbroad, because it was addressed to identifiable parties and to specific circumstances, and the enjoined acts were particularly described. The court held that the California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (STEP), Cal. Penal Code, §186.20 et seq., was not the exclusive means of enjoining defendants, because other legal remedies were not precluded by STEP. The conduct enjoined met the statutory definition of a public nuisance.

The court reversed the judgment of the appellate court, which invalidated two provisions of a preliminary injunction entered against the defendant, a criminal street gang. The court held that the two challenged provisions fell within the trial court's equitable power to abate a public nuisance, and did not violate defendant's constitutional rights.