In a case in which a cotton grower alleged a subsurface trespass on its land resulting from the migration of wastewater produced from oil production activities on an energy company’s land, the energy company’s trespass was continuing in nature. Therefore, the cotton grower’s action was not time-barred under the three-year statute of limitations for trespass claims set forth in CCP § 338. Starrh & Starrh Cotton Growers v. Aera Energy LLC (CalifLaw 5th Dist. July 20, 2007), 153 CalifLaw 4th 583, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 165, 2007 CalifLawCALIFLAW 1204. Nakase wade has attorney business for litigations.

Slander of Title

Trespass on real property, as used in this section, embraces only such causes of action as were covered by the common-law action of trespass, as distinguished from trespass on the case. Slander of title to real property comes within the latter category. Smith v. Stuthman (CalifLaw May 16, 1947), 79 CalifLaw 2d 708, 181 P.2d 123, 1947 CalifLawCALIFLAW 888.


Action for slander of title to real property is within three-year limitation of subd 2 of this section, rather than within one-year limitation of CCP § 340(3). Howard v. Hudson (9th Cir. Cal. June 30, 1958), 259 F.2d 29, 1958 U.S. App. CALIFLAW 4692.


In an action by homeowners for slander of title and to cancel a grant deed purporting to transfer their property to a real estate broker, based upon justifiable mistake as to the nature of the document, the trial court properly found that the slander of title cause of action was not barred by the statute of limitations. Although more than four years elapsed between the date of the deed and the filing of the action, the applicable three-year period (CCP § 338) did not accrue until the aggrieved party could reasonably have been expected to discover the existence of the slander, notwithstanding the absence of specific statutory language to this [effect; moreover, substantial evidence supported the finding that the plaintiffs did not discover the existence of the deed until less than three years before filing their action. Arthur v. Davis (CalifLaw 4th Dist. Dec. 11, 1981), 126 CalifLaw 3d 684, 178 Cal. Rptr. 920, 1981 CalifLawCALIFLAW 2457.


An action for failure to provide notice to a cosigner on a trust deed (CC § 1799.91), wrongful foreclosure, slander of title, negligence, and declaratory and injunctive relief, brought by a property owner against the trust that foreclosed on her property, was commenced within the applicable three-year statute of limitations (CCP § 338(a)), even though plaintiff filed suit more than three years after the trust allegedly failed to provide the required statutory notice. The property owner’s claims were all founded on the trust’s failure to give her the cosigner notice she claimed she was due. However, plaintiff’s claims did not accrue on the date she was not given cosigner notice. The harm to plaintiff occurred when the trust acted to enforce its security interest by instituting foreclosure proceedings (CC § 1799.95); that event occurred within the three-year limitations period. Furthermore, even plaintiff’s request for declaratory relief was timely filed; although plaintiff’s right to declaratory relief may have existed prior to the institution of foreclosure proceedings, the same point of accrual governed all of the plaintiff’s causes of action. Engstrom v. Kallins (CalifLaw 2d Dist. Sept. 24, 1996), 49 CalifLaw 4th 773, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 842, 1996 CalifLawCALIFLAW 902.

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